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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This case concerns an appeal following the Order issued on
July 23, 2012 by the United States Court for New Union. The
Order granted Shifty Maleau’s motion to dismiss and denied
Jacques Bonhomme’s motion to dismiss the cross-claim brought
by Shifty Maleau and State of Progress. The district court had
proper subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case under 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (2012). The order of the district court is final, and
jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291
(2012) (providing for “jurisdiction of appeals form all final
decisions of the district courts of the United States . . . .”).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Whether a foreign citizen is a proper plaintiff under the
citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act when the foreign
citizen has no private right of action, his domestic employer
incurs all litigation-related expenses, he stands to benefit from
the outcome, and he has a substantive right to bring the case.
2. Whether waste piles of gold mining overburden that are
eroded by rainwater runoff constitute point sources under the
Clean Water Act.
3. Whether Reedy Creek, which travels from State of Union
to State of Progress and is involved in commerce in both states, is
navigable water when the EPA interprets “waters of the United
States” to include interstate waters and water that substantially
effects interstate commerce.
4. Whether Ditch C-1 is a tributary of Reedy Creek as it
sustains a relatively permanent water flow and is physically
connected to navigable water.
5. Whether Bonhomme may be held liable for discharges of
pollutants through the culvert on his property, over which he is
owner and operator, even when he himself did not add the
pollutants to the water.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a final order of the District Court for
the District of New Union, granting Shifty Maleau’s (Maleau)
motion to dismiss and denying Jacques Bonhomme’s (Bonhomme)
motion to dismiss. R. at 8, 10.
Initially, Bonhomme filed a complaint against Maleau
alleging violations of the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. §§
1251-1387 (2012), relying upon the citizen suit provision of the
CWA (Id. at § 1365) to do so. R. at 4. The complaint alleged that
Maleau was in violation of CWA § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2012),
as a result of mining activities in the State of Progress (Progress).
R. at 4-5.
Later, Progress filed a separate claim against Bonhomme,
alleging that he discharged arsenic into Reedy Creek in violation
of CWA § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2012). R. at 5. Maleau
intervened in this later action as a matter of right under CWA §
505(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (2012), and subsequently
moved to consolidate the action with the suit filed by Bonhomme.
R. at 5. The district court granted the motion to consolidate, R. at
5, and both Bonhomme and Maleau filed motions to dismiss the
actions against them. R. at 5.
The district court granted Maleau’s motion to dismiss, while
denying Bonhomme’s motion for relief. R. at 8, 10. In so doing,
the court held that: (1) Bonhomme was not a real party in
interest, (2) As a foreign citizen Bonhomme had no statutory
right to bring a claim under the “citizen suit” provision of the
CWA, (3) Maleau’s mining overburden piles were not point
sources under the CWA, (4) Ditch C-1 was not a “navigable water
of the United States”, (5) Reedy Creek was a “navigable water of
the United States”, and (6) that Bonhomme was liable for the
discharge of arsenic into Reedy Creek. R. at 8-10.
All three parties filed a Notice of Appeal.
R. at 1.
Bonhomme challenges all holdings of the district court. R. at 1-2.
Maleau appeals the court’s holding that Reedy Creek is a
navigable water of the United States. R. at 2. Progress contests
the decision of the lower court that Ditch C-1 is not a navigable
water of the United States. R. at 2.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Maleau operates a gold mine next to the navigable Buena
Vista River and trucks the overburden and slag to his property in
Jefferson County. R. at 5. He places the waste into piles located
near Ditch C-1. Id. The Ditch was constructed in 1913, and is
protected by restrictive covenants that run with the property
requiring owners to maintain the Ditch. Id. Ditch C-1 is
permanent, though water flow may be interrupted for several
weeks to three months by annual periods of drought. Id.
Rain water runoff has created natural channels flowing away
from the base of the piles near Ditch C-1. Id. When it rains,
water filters through the piles, flows through the channels along
the ground, and eventually discharges into Ditch C-1. Id. The
water flows through the Ditch and away from Maleau’s property
for three miles, passing through several agricultural properties,
which also drain into the Ditch. Id. The Ditch then enters
Bonhomme’s property, and discharges into Reedy Creek through
a culvert on Bonhomme’s property. Id.
Reedy Creek starts in New Union, flowing for fifty miles
through the State of Progress, and ultimately ending in Wildman
Marsh. R. at 5-6. It serves as a permanent water source for
Bounty Plaza, a service area along Interstate Highway 250 (I250). R. at 5. The water is used for agricultural purposes in both
Progress and New Union, and the agricultural products from both
states are sold in interstate commerce. Id.
Wildman Marsh is located primarily inside the Wildman
National Wildlife Refuge, which is owned and maintained by the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. R. at 6. The Marsh is a major
destination for duck hunters, with many coming from
surrounding states, and some coming from international
destinations. R. at 6. This interstate tourism adds twenty-five
million dollars to the local economy. Id.
Despite the presence of arsenic in Ditch C-1, Reedy Creek,
Wildman Marsh, and three birds in Wildman Marsh, there have
been no notable changes in flora and fauna surrounding the
Marsh. Id. Even still, Bonhomme alleges that the arsenic
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negatively impacts the Creek, Marsh, and visiting fauna, making
him afraid to continue his hunting activities in those areas. Id.
Bonhomme is a French national employed by Precious Metals
International, Inc. (PMI), R. at 8, which is a domestic entity
headquartered in New York and incorporated in Delaware. R. at
6. In addition to serving as PMI’s President and a member of the
board, Bonhomme is the largest shareholder, owning three
percent of outstanding shares. R. at 7. While PMI owns no
property in Progress or New Union, Id., Bonhomme owns a lodge
in Progress, R. at 6, which he uses exclusively for hunting parties
comprised largely by business clients and associates of PMI. R. at
7-8.
PMI has incurred all litigation expenses, paying for
Bonhomme’s attorney, expert witness fees, and conducting or
purchasing analysis to support Bonhomme’s claim. R. at 7.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
This is an appeal from an order granting a motion to dismiss
under 33 U.S.C. § 1311, 1362, 1362. Also on appeal is the district
courts findings of law as they relate to the CWA §§ 1251 -1387.
When ruling on a motion to dismiss all factual allegations in the
complaint will be accepted as true. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 94 (2007). The standard of review for all relevant issues is de
novo. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 557-58 (1988).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The district court was correct in holding that Bonhomme was
not a proper plaintiff, that Maleau’s overburden piles are not
point sources, that Bonhomme is liable for discharges occurring
on his property, and that Reedy Creek is a navigable water of the
United States. The district court erred in holding Ditch C-1 is not
a navigable water of the United States. Bonhomme is not a
proper plaintiff because only citizens of the United States may
bring suits under section 505 of the CWA, and he is not a real
party in interest. Additionally, Maleau’s overburden piles are not
point sources under the CWA because they are not discrete
conveyances, and are nonpoint sources unregulated by the Act.

5
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Ditch C-1 is a water of the United States both because it is a
relatively permanent body of water and because it is a tributary
of navigable water. Finally, Bonhomme is liable for the addition
of arsenic to Reedy Creek because landowners are liable for the
pollutants they discharge.
Bonhomme is not a proper plaintiff under § 505 of the CWA
and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17. The citizen suit provision
of the CWA broadly defines “citizen” but the use of the term itself
cannot be ignored. By interpreting citizen to encompass any
person or entity residing in any nation, this Court would be
ignoring the Congressional intent behind the provision. The
district court correctly held that § 505 of the CWA does not
provide Bonhomme, a French national, with a statutory right of
action. Even if Bonhomme were able to maintain the action, he is
not a real party in interest. Bonhomme does not have a
significant interest in the litigation because his employer has
incurred all litigation expenses and nearly all litigation benefits
would accrue to his employer. As this issue was timely raised
and the real party in interest has not been joined, the district
court correctly dismissed Bonhomme’s complaint.
Maleau’s overburden piles are not point sources because they
are not discernible, confined and discrete conveyances. See 33
U.S.C. § 1362(14). Although several courts have noted that the
CWA’s provisions relating to point sources should be construed
broadly (Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1354 (2d Cir.
1991), holding that piles of rock that do not channel or collect the
polluted water would be to effectively eliminate the point source
requirement from the CWA. Cordiano v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc.,
575 F.3d 199, 218 (2d Cir. 2009). Defendant Maleau’s waste piles,
if they are subject to regulation at all, should be regulated by the
State of Progress as nonpoint sources. Un-channeled rainwater
runoff or percolation that carries manmade pollutants to nearby
waters has repeatedly been classified as nonpoint source pollution
(Cordiano, 575 F.3d at 220-21), and such pollution is not due to
be controlled by the CWA. Abston Constr. Co., 620 F.2d at 43.
Reedy Creek is navigable water under the CWA. Reedy
Creek travels from New Union to Progress and sustains a
relatively permanent water flow. In both New Union and
Progress Reedy Creek is used to irrigate crops that are sold in
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interstate commerce. It is also used as a water source by Bounty
Plaza which supplies I-250, an interstate highway. Reedy Creek
feeds into a wetland that is also the site of a federal wildlife
preserve. Pursuant to the EPA and 40 C.F.R. 122.2 interstate
water is defined as waters of the United States. Reedy Creek is
also subject to the CWA as it substantially effects interstate
commerce. Finally, pursuant to the Property Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, water in the wildlife preserve is also water of the
United States. While the regulations reflect the EPA’s
interpretation of the CWA, each of these interpretations are
reasonable and should be subjected to Chevron deference.
Therefore Reedy Creek is navigable water subject to the authority
of the CWA.
Ditch C-1 is navigable water pursuant to the CWA. Ditch C-1
is a relatively permanent irrigation ditch that is protected by
permanent restrictive covenants in the deeds of the properties
that the ditch runs through. Tributaries are streams of water
which contributes its flow to a larger stream. Ditch C-1 is
physically connected to Reedy Creek and sustains water flow
except in times of annual draught. Ditches may be listed as
possible point sources, but ditches are not confined to only being
point sources. When a ditch sustains a relatively permanent
water flow like Ditch C-1, it may be defined as a tributary under
the CWA. Therefore Ditch C-1 is navigable water subject to the
authority of the CWA.
Bonhomme must be held liable for any discharges of
pollutants because they are discharged through the culvert on his
property. Owners and operators of point sources are liable for the
pollutants they discharge, regardless of whether the owner or
operator took any affirmative action to add the pollutant or
channel the polluted water. See S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v.
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 104-05 (2004).
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ARGUMENT
I.

BONHOMME IS NOT A PROPER PLAINTIFF AND
THEREFORE THE DISTRICT COURT
CORRECTLY DISMISSED HIS COMPLAINT

To be a proper plaintiff, a party must hold an enforceable
legal right entitled to maintain an action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17. To
be enforceable, the right or interest must be legally protectable
and created by substantive law. Donaldson v. United States, 400
U.S. 517 (1971). The Clean Water Act provides a substantive
remedy for citizens harmed by violations of the Act. Clean Water
Act (CWA) § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2012). Bonhomme argues
that CWA § 505 provides a substantive remedy for all persons,
regardless of citizenship. The language and intent of the Act
dictate otherwise. Section 505 of the CWA limits the substantive
remedy to American citizens. Recognizing this, the district court
properly dismissed Bonhomme’s complaint.
To maintain a cause of action as a proper plaintiff, a party
must also be a real party in interest. A real party in interest
must have a substantive legal right and a significant interest at
stake in the litigation. New Orleans Pub. Serv. v. United Gas Pipe
Line, 732 F.2d 452, 464 (5th Cir. 1984). Bonhomme asserts that
he is the real party in interest where the hunting parties he
organizes may be impacted by discharges into Wildman Marsh.
The district court disagreed, correctly holding that the real party
in interest and beneficiary of the litigation is PMI.
A. Bonhomme’s suit was properly dismissed because
he has no statutory right to bring suit under
section 505 of the Clean Water Act, as he is not a
citizen of the United States.
Bonhomme has no substantive right to maintain any action
under section 505 of the CWA, as the Act only enables claims by
American citizens. “[A]ny citizen” may commence an action
under the “Citizen suits” section of the Clean Water Act. Clean
Water Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2012). The section was
enacted to “encourage citizen participation” in enforcing the
Clean Water Act. Minnesota v. Callaway, 401 F. Supp. 524, 528
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n.4 (D. Minn. 1975) rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Minnesota v.
Hoffman, 543 F.2d 1198 (8th Cir. 1976).
The statutory language defining the citizen suit provision
does not support Bonhomme’s limitless interpretation of citizen.
In creating the private right of action under section 505, Congress
defined “citizen” as “a person . . . having an interest which . . .
may be adversely affected.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (2012). It further
defined “person” as any “individual, corporation, partnership,
association, State, municipality, commission, or political
subdivision of a state, or any interstate body.” Id.
By defining the narrow phrase “citizen” to include a broader
range of potential plaintiffs, the court did not deprive the term
“citizen” of all meaning. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty.
v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159, 172
(2001). In SWANCC, the Supreme Court interpreted the narrow
phrase “navigable waters” under the CWA. Id.; United States v.
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985). Congress
had broadened “navigable waters” by defining it as including
“waters of the United States.” United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985). Upon review, the Court
rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the broader interpretation
should include “all waters of the United States. SWANCC, at 172
(emphasis added). It held that Congress did not deprive the
narrower “navigable waters” of all meaning, but rather the
narrower definition imposed navigability requirements on those
regulated waters of the United States. Id.
SWANCC guides the court’s interpretation here. Just as in
SWANCC, Congress has given a narrow concept under the Clean
Water Act a broad definition. Bonhomme argues that “citizen”
encompasses any individual, regardless of nationality. Such a
definition would deprive the term of all meaning, and would
challenge the precedent set forth by the Supreme Court. Here,
SWANCC counsels that “citizen” constrain “all persons”, limiting
the section 505 private right of action to American citizens. The
district court, using the SWANCC’s interpretive guidance,
correctly held that the narrower term imposes outer limits on the
broader definition.
Allowing foreign citizens to bring section 505 claims is
against the policy and legislative intent of the section. Congress
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intended for the citizen suit provision of the CWA to be a tool to
abate ongoing and continuous pollution. Gwaltney of Smithfield,
Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 61, (1987). At
the same time, Congress saw section 505 as a way to increase
citizen participation in government and lawmaking. S. Rep. No.
1196 at 36 (1970) (section 505 facilitates citizen participation in
CAA enforcement); 116 Cong. Rec. 33, 102-03 (1970) (Sen. Muskie
supporting bill as increasing public participation through
enforcement process). Allowing foreign nationals to participate in
domestic policymaking and enforcement will not serve to increase
opportunities for American citizens to play the role envisioned by
Congress when it passed section 505. Congress’ focus on citizens
participating with their government strongly suggests an intent
to limit the private right of action to American citizens.
Broadening the term would run counter to this intent, deprive
“citizen” of its meaning, and run counter to the Supreme Court’s
holding in SWANCC. As the Act only contemplates citizens of the
United States as plaintiffs under section 505 of the CWA,
Bonhomme has no statutory right of action.
B. Bonhomme is not a real party in interest where
only his employer has a substantive right to
maintain the action, his employer has incurred all
expenses related to the litigation, and nearly all
benefits of litigation would accrue to his employer.
Bonhomme is not a real party in interest as he has no
substantive right at issue in the litigation and his interest in the
infrequent hunting trips is not substantial. Every action in
federal court must be asserted by the real party in interest. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 17(a)(1); See Farrell Constr. Co. v. Jefferson Parish, 896
F.2d 136, 140 (5th Cir. 1990); Certain Interested Underwriters at
Lloyd’s v. Layne, 26 F.3d 39, 42 (6th Cir. 1994). Real parties in
interest are those persons possessing the right or interest to be
enforced in the litigation, Hanna Mining Co. v. Minn. Power &
Light Co., 573 F. Supp. 1395, 1397 (D. Minn. 1983), aff’d, 739
F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1984), and who have significant interest in
the litigation. Stichting Ter Behartiging v. Schreiber, 407 F.3d
34, 48 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005); 4-17 James W. Moore et al., Moore’s
Federal Practice – Civil § 17.10 (3d ed. 1997). Significant
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interests are direct, and substantial. New Orleans Pub. Serv. v.
United Gas Pipe Line, 732 F.2d 452, 464 (5th Cir. 1984); See also
Heyman v. Exchange Nat’l Bank, 615 F.2d 1190, 1194 (7th Cir.
1980) (suggesting that low probability of success, affecting
expected payout of proceeding, could render interest
insubstantial); Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
A party lacking a substantive legal right is not the real party
in interest as to enforcement of that right. Virginia Elec & Power
Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 485 F.2d 78, 83 (4th Cir. 1973).
Upon timely objection, dismissal of action is proper once a
reasonable time has been allowed to join the real party in
interest. Fed. R. Civ. P 17. Bonhomme enjoys no substantive
right under section 505 of the Clean Water Act (See supra
subsection A) and therefore cannot be a real party in interest
under Rule 17. Even if Bonhomme was entitled to a right
enforceable under the citizen suit provision, he has no substantial
interest in the litigation.
An agent acting solely for the interests of others is not a real
party in interest. In Airlines Reporting Corp., the Second Circuit
found a corporate agent working on behalf of airlines to be an
improper plaintiff where it advanced a claim that would solely
benefit the airlines. Airlines Reporting Corp. v. S & N Travel,
Inc., 58 F.3d 857 (2d Cir. 1995). The agent did not suffer any
pecuniary loss from the litigation, and all potential benefits
flowed to the airlines. Id. at 862. As the benefits of litigation
accrued to the airlines, and the agent had suffered minimal loss,
the court held the agent to be a ‘mere conduit’ for a remedy owned
by others. Id. The court refused to allow the airlines to “enlist”
their representative to maintain the action when the actual losses
had been suffered by the airlines themselves. Id.
Where an agent maintains an interest in the subject of
litigation, the agent may be the real party in interest. In
Hollander, the court found an investment bank to be a proper
plaintiff when it litigated a prior transaction and had retained
11.53% of the paper involved. Oscar Gruss & Son Inc. v.
Hollander, 337 F.3d 186, 192 (2d Cir. 2003). The court recognized
that the bank had suffered a pecuniary loss, and that ownership
of the 11.53% of the paper gave the company a “valid stake” in
the litigation. Id. at 194. The court considered the facts that

11
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bank had pressed the litigation itself and had been involved in
the underlying transaction in concluding that the bank was more
than a “mere conduit.” Id.
Bonhomme is not a real party in interest because any
potential benefits of this litigation will be enjoyed by his
Just as the
employer, Precious Metals International, Inc.
benefits of litigation flowed through the airlines’ agent in Airlines
Reporting Corp., here any potential payoff will be enjoyed by PMI.
Bonhomme uses the lodge exclusively to host hunting parties for
PMI’s business clients and associates. While Bonhomme may
gain some personal satisfaction from holding these business
retreats, the overwhelming presence of PMI’s business partners
strongly suggests that the hunting parties are for the benefit of
his employer, PMI. Much like the agent in Airlines Reporting
Corp., Bonhomme is “merely a conduit” to channel potential
benefits of this litigation.
Bonhomme is not a real party in interest because he has
little personal interest in the litigation. He has suffered little if
any loss in this litigation. PMI has borne all litigation expense providing Bonhomme’s attorney and developing scientific
evidence - freeing Bonhomme from the costs of this action. While
Bonhomme is concerned about the health of the fauna in
Wildman Creek, no negative effects on the wildlife have been
observed. Bonhomme may argue that under Hollander his 3%
stake in PMI constitutes a substantial interest. His degree of
separation from the litigation and lesser interest suggest
otherwise. The bank in Hollander retained 11.5% of the notes
underlying the litigation – nearly four times as much as
Bonhomme’s interest in PMI. More important – the bank in
Hollander was intimately involved in the subject of the litigation
and controlled the litigation itself. Unlike the notes at the center
of the controversy in Hollander, Bonhomme’s interest in PMI is
not affected or in dispute in this case. While the plaintiff in
Hollander controlled and funded the litigation itself, here PMI,
not Bonhomme, is undertaking the expense of litigation.
Bonhomme’s lack of involvement and PMI’s domination of any
benefits undermine Bonhomme’s claim to a substantial interest
in the litigation.
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As Bonhomme has no substantive right under CWA section
505 and has no substantial interest in the litigation, he is not a
real party in interest. Under the Supreme Court’s interpretive
guidelines in SWANCC, Section 505 is properly read to require
American citizenship to maintain a cause of action.
The
legislative history of Section 505 reinforces the limitation of the
private right of action to American Citizens. As Bonhomme is a
French national, he has no remedy available to him under Section
505 of the Clean Water Act. Further, Maleau objected to
Bonhomme’s status as a real party in interest in his answer, and
has provided Bonhomme and PMI opportunity to amend their
complaints to include a real party in interest. Both Bonhomme
and PMI have declined to do so, despite reasonable opportunity.
As Bonhomme is not a proper plaintiff and failed to join a real
party in interest despite reasonable opportunity, the district court
correctly dismissed his complaint.
II. REEDY CREEK IS A PERMANENT FLOWING
INTERSTATE BODY OF WATER THAT IS
SUBSTANTIALLY INVOLVED IN INTERSTATE
COMMERCE AND THEREFORE NAVIGABLE
WATER AS DEFINED BY THE CWA
The purpose of the CWA is “to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s
waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2012). The CWA also charges the EPA
with the responsibility of issuing permits for the discharge of
pollutants into navigable water from any point source. Id. §§
1311, 1362. Most relevant here, the CWA defines navigable
water as “waters of the United States, including the territorial
seas.” Id. §1362.
Although Congress structured the CWA
authority around “navigability,” it has been held that this term is
of limited import and “some waters would not be deemed
navigable under the terms classical understanding.” United
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133
(1985).The EPA interpreted navigability to include interstate
waters. 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2012). Reedy Creek travels between
New Union and Progress and is therefore navigable water under
the CWA. The lower court properly held that Reedy Creek is
navigable water.

13
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A. Reedy creek is an interstate water with relatively
permanent water flow that is a navigable water
under the CWA
The CWA states the EPA has authority to issue permits for
discharge of pollutants into navigable water. 33 U.S.C. § 1342
(2012). The real issue is how to define navigability, as the CWA
only further defines navigability as “waters of the United States.”
Id. §1362(7). Early in the CWA’s history the EPA and courts
interpreted navigability narrowly to mean only navigable-in-fact.
The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1870). Since then the EPA has
expanded the definition to include “interstate waters, including
interstate wetlands.” 40 C.F.R. § 122.2. Essentially, the courts
and EPA took notice that Congress meant for the CWA to reach
more water than just those with the ability to support travel by
water. Without additional guidance from Congress, the Supreme
Court tried to settle the issue of navigability in Rapanos.
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy wrote plurality opinions
in Rapanos setting forth two different tests expanding the reach
of navigability in the CWA. Justice Scalia focused on a textual
analysis founding that the CWA permit program only applied to
“relatively permanent, standing or flowing bodies of water,” and
not to “ordinarily dry channels through which water occasionally
or intermittently flows.” Id. at 716. He was concerned with
limiting the reach of navigability and stated “waters of the
United States includes only those relatively permanent, standing
or continuously flowing bodies of water.” Id. at 739. Justice
Scalia adds an element of surface connection to a traditional
navigable water to establish navigability for adjacent wetlands,
but this element is irrelevant to the determination of navigability
of Reedy Creek.
Justice Kennedy ultimately concurred in the judgment but
disagreed with Justice Scalia’s relatively permanent requirement.
Id. at 768. Justice Kennedy supported a significant nexus test
and believed that the question of navigability must be determined
in relation to the CWA’s goals and purpose. Id. at 760. Although
Justice Kennedy’s test specifically related to the expansion of
navigability to non-navigable wetlands, Justice Kennedy’s
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opinion also supports a finding that Reedy Creek is navigable
water.
Reedy Creek is a 50 mile long permanent body of water that
starts in New Union. R. at 5. It then travels to Progress where it
congregates in a wetland located within Progress. Id. Reedy
Creek is a permanent source of water and is sufficient to be used
as a water supply for Bounty Plaza along the I-250 interstate
highway. Id. While Reedy Creek travels between two different
states it squarely falls under the EPA’s regulation that interstate
waters are waters of the United States. Reedy Creek’s flow of
water obviously satisfies Justice Scalia’s permanency or
continuously flowing requirement. This interstate flow and Reedy
Creek’s involvement in interstate commerce, as will be discussed
below, also helps balance Justice Scalia’s federalism concerns.
It is also for the same reasons of permanency and interstate
travel that Reedy Creek qualifies as waters of the United States
per Justice Kennedy’s opinion. Justice Kennedy believed that
even the plurality was “unduly dismissive of the important public
interest. . .served by the CWA in general.” Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715
at 777. While the purpose of the CWA is to protect our nation’s
waters, including interstate water, under these facts it would be
antithetical to the CWA to not define Reedy Creek as navigable
water.
Navigability as defined in the CWA is clearly ambiguous as
courts have struggled to define it, and Congress has not directly
spoken to the issue. The EPA has interpreted this term to include
interstate waters and wetlands that have a significant nexus to
interstate waters.
40 C.F.R. § 122.2.
Because the EPA
interpretation almost systematically follows the Rapanos
relatively permanent test it is a reasonable interpretation and
should be given Chevron deference. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
While Reedy Creek should be deemed navigable by virtue of
its permanent nature and interstate characteristics, it may also
be deemed navigable by its substantial effect on interstate
commerce.
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B. Reedy Creek is subject to the authority of the CWA
because the creek substantially affects interstate
commerce
Pursuant to the Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.
3, Congress has the authority to regulate over anything that
substantially effects interstate commerce. United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995). Rapanos and SWANCC fail to
completely address the effect of interstate commerce and its effect
on defining water as navigable. Earth Science directly addressed
the issue of the impact of interstate commerce and held “Congress
intended to regulate discharges made into every creek, stream,
river or body of water that in any way may affect interstate
commerce.” United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368,
375 (10th Cir. 1979). Nothing in Rapanos disturbed or reversed
this interpretation of the CWA.
Rapanos consisted of two consolidated cases dealing with the
Corps designation of a wholly intermittent intrastate wetlands as
navigable water. Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715 at 762-63. Justice Scalia
took issue with authorizing federal action pursuant to the
Commerce Clause without a “clearer statement from Congress.”
Id. at 737. He believed this expansion would intrude into an area
of traditional state authority of land use regulation. Id. at 716.
SWANCC also dealt with a wholly intrastate abandoned
gravel pit that the Corps tried to regulate using the Migratory
Bird Rule rely on Congress’ commerce power. Solid Waste Agency
of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159
(2001). The Court held that the Migratory Bird Rule exceeded
the authority granted to the Corps under the CWA. Id. at 684.
However, SWANCC explicitly stated the court did not consider
“whether Congress could exercise such authority consistent with
the Commerce Clause.” Id. at 677-78.
Unlike Rapanos and SWANCC, this case involves a
permanent interstate body of water, not an intrastate wetland.
R. at 5. While expanding the authority of the CWA in the prior
situations may have implicated federalism concerns, this case
does not implicate the same issues as the water travels between
two different states and substantially effects different areas of
interstate commerce.
Reedy Creek’s substantial effect on
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interstate commerce allows it to fall under the third prong of the
Lopez test. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 at 559.
Reedy Creek is used as a water source at Bounty Plaza for
travelers on I-250, a major interstate highway. R. at 5. Without a
reliable water source a store would not be able to operate and this
store operates for the benefit of interstate travelers. Second,
Reedy Creek is used for the irrigation of agriculture by farmers in
two different states who sell their goods in interstate commerce.
Id. Third, Reedy Creek supplies a wetland that attracts hunters
from around the world and infuses approximately 25 million
dollars into the economy. R. at 6. Sustaining the health of the
wetland is critical to maintaining the ability to hunt and there is
already evidence that some ducks in Wildman Marsh are
contaminated with arsenic. Id. A contamination of the bird
population would result in a destruction of this 25 million dollar
recreational activity.
C. Under the property clause, Congress has the
ability to regulate Reedy Creek
Reedy Creek may also be found to be a navigable tributary of
the federal wildlife preserve. Pursuant to the Property Clause,
U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2., the water in Wildman Marsh
National Wildlife Refuge is waters of the United States. Because
Wildman Marsh National Wildlife Refuge is a federally owned
wildlife refuge, the water is subject to Congress’ control.
Intuitively the ability to control the water on the wildlife would
include the ability to control the waters connected to the wetland.
Cappaert v. U. S., 426 U.S. 128 (1976) (the Property Clause
permits federal regulation of federal lands and encompasses
rights in navigable and non-navigable streams). If Congress is
not able to regulate Reedy Creek, any control over the wetland
would be a fiction, as there would be no actual control over the
wetland water. Therefore, the lower court was correct in findings
that Reedy Creeks is navigable water.
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III. PILES OF GOLD MINING OVERBURDEN, OVER
WHICH RAINWATER RUNOFF NATURALLY
FLOWS, ARE NOT POINT SOURCES UNDER THE
CLEAN WATER ACT
The Clean Water Act (“CWA”), a revolutionary piece of
legislation designed to “restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters” (33
U.S.C. § 1251 (2012)), imposes strict effluent limitations for the
discharge of pollutants, and enumerates the circumstances under
which the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) may issue
permits for such discharges. Id. § 1311. While the CWA is
admittedly broad and its provisions far reaching, its jurisdiction
is not without bounds. The National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (“NPDES”), under which the EPA has
authority to issue permits for otherwise impermissible
discharges, only regulates the “discharge of pollutants.” Id.
Congress took great care to define discharge of pollutants as “any
addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point
source.” Id. § 1362. Courts have repeatedly held that Congress’s
language in the CWA clearly indicates that nonpoint source
pollution (which most commonly occurs when rainwater runoff
carries pollutants to nearby navigable waters), does not fall under
the jurisdiction of the NPDES program (See Oregon Natural
Desert Ass’n v. Dombeck, 172 F.3d 1092, 1098 (9th Cir. 1998));
thus, Defendant Maleau’s waste piles may only trigger liability
under the CWA if they are classified as point sources. See Karr v.
Hefner, 475 F.3d 1192, 1203 (9th Cir. 2007) (“To identify a. .
.discharge violation requires identifying a point source.”); United
States Pub. Interest Research Grp. v. Heritage Salmon, Inc., No.
00-150-B-C, 2002 LEXIS 2706, at *31 (D. Me. Feb. 19, 2002) (“The
classification as a point source is crucial as the Act only prohibits
discharges form a point source”).
The overburden piles are not point sources because they are
not discernible, confined and discrete conveyances. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(14); 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2013). Although several courts have
noted that the CWA’s provisions relating to point sources should
be construed broadly (Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343,
1354 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Sierra Club v. Abston Constr. Co.,
620 F.2d 41, 45-56 (5th Cir. 1980)), holding that piles of rock that
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do not channel or collect the polluted water would be to effectively
eliminate the point source requirement from the CWA. Cordiano
v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 575 F.3d 199, 218 (2d Cir. 2009);
United States v. Plaza Health Lab., 3 F.3d 643, 646 (2d Cir. 1993).
Defendant Maleau’s waste piles, if they are subject to
regulation at all, should be regulated by the State of Progress as
nonpoint sources. Un-channeled rainwater runoff or percolation
that carries manmade pollutants to nearby waters has repeatedly
been classified as nonpoint source pollution. Cordiano, 575 F.3d
at 220-21. Such pollution is not due to be controlled by the CWA.
Abston Constr. Co., 620 F.2d at 43 (citing S. Rep. No. 92-414
(1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3744).
For the foregoing reasons, this court should affirm the
decision of the Court below and hold that the piles of mining
overburden are not point sources.
A. Piles of mining overburden waste are not
discernible, confined and discrete conveyances.
The EPA’s jurisdiction under the NPDES program only
extends to discharges of pollutants from a point source. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1311. A point source is any discernible, confined and discrete
conveyance that channels or collects the polluted water before it
is discharged into a navigable water. 33 U.S.C. §1311; Abston
Constr. Co., 620 F.2d at 44-45; 40 C.F.R. § 122.2; Defendant
Maleau’s waste piles of mining overburden are not point sources
because they are not conveyances, and do not channel or collect
the polluted water.
Interpretation of the CWA’s point source provisions must
commence with the language of the statute itself. Estate of
Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475 (1992);
Cordiano, 575 F.3d at 218. In § 502 of the CWA, Congress very
specifically defined point source as any “discernible, confined and
discrete conveyance.” Courts have repeatedly stated that it
should always be assumed that Congress purposefully chose to
employ particular words in a statute; thus, this court should
strongly consider Congress’s use of the word conveyance to define
point sources. IUE-CWA v. Visteon Corp. (In re Visteon Corp.),
612 F.3d 210, 220 (3d Cir. 2010); Cordiano, 575 F.3d at 218.

19

104 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 5
The term “conveyance” has a clear meaning, and this Court
should find that Maleau’s waste piles do not fit into that
definition. Multiple dictionaries define conveyance as a means of
transportation that carries people or things form one place to
another.
Conveyance
Definition,
merriam-webster.com,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/conveyance
(last
visited 2013); Conveyance Definition, oxforddictionaries.com,
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english
/conveyance (last visited 2013). This definition is clearly reflected
by the list of example point sources provided by Congress in the
CWA, which includes pipes, ditches, channels, tunnels, and
conduits. 33 U.S.C. § 1362. Admittedly, this list is not exhaustive;
however, the examples chosen by Congress all evoke images of
physical structures specifically built to convey water. Defendant
Maleau’s waste piles are completely dissimilar from any such
structure and clearly outside the scope of any logically
conceivable definition of conveyance. R. at 5. The waste piles do
not transport or carry the polluted water to Ditch C-1; rather,
water naturally flows over them and is carried through naturally
formed channels at the base of the piles to the ditch. R. at 5.
Plaintiff Bonhomme has brought forth no evidence to suggest that
Maleau positioned the waste piles in such a manner that they
formed any sort of earthen channel. This Court should not put
itself in the position of the legislature and instead rely on the
clear definition of the words employed by Congress in the CWA.
Even if this Court decides to approach the point source issue
using a broader definition of the term, Maleau’s waste piles
cannot be classified as point sources because “simple erosion over
the material surface, resulting in the discharge of water and
other materials into navigable waters, does not constitute a point
source discharge, absent some effort to change the surface, to
direct the waterflow [sic], or otherwise impede its progress.”
Abston Constr. Co., 620 F.2d 41, 44-45.
Whether a discharge occurred through a point source is a
question of fact, and courts have consistently found that some
kind of conveying structure or impediment to natural water flow
must exist for a point source to be present. The CWA is not meant
to prohibit naturally induced, random run-off pollutants.
Concerned Residents for the Env’t v. Southview Farm, 834 F.
Supp. 1410, 1417 (W.D.N.Y. 1993).
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The CWA’s sweeping objective of restoring the Nation’s
waters has led many courts to abide by a broad interpretation of
point source (United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368,
373 (10th Cir. 1979) (stating in dicta that “the concept of a point
source was designed to further this [permit regulatory] scheme by
embracing the broadest possible definition of [point source”);
however, the term cannot be interpreted so broadly as to
eliminate the point source requirement from the CWA. Cordiano,
575 F.3d at 219. Point source discharges occur when some
structure—whether naturally occurring or man-made—collects
and channels polluted water before transferring it to a navigable
water. The CWA is not meant to prohibit naturally induced,
random run-off pollutants (Concerned Residents for the Env’t, 834
F. Supp. at 1417), but instead contemplates regulation of
“channelized” discharges. Waterkeeper Alliance Inc. v. EPA, 399
F.3d 486, 510 (2d Cir. 2005). See also Greater Yellowstone
Coalition v. Lewis, 628 F.3d 1143, 1152 (9th Cir. 2010) (The text
of the CWA makes it clear that some type of collection or
channeling is required to classify a discharge as being from a
point source); Consolidation Coal Co. v. Costle, 604 F.2d 239, 249
(4th Cir. 1979) (Point source discharges do not include unchanneled and uncollected surface waters). In order for the
polluted waters to be channelized, there generally must exist
some artificial system for moving water, waste, or other
materials. Froebel v. Meyer, 217 F.3d 928, 937 (7th Cir. 2000).
The court in Rapanos v. United States emphasized that the
examples of point sources provided by Congress in the CWA are
terms usually associated with “watercourses through which
waters typically flow,” and states that the origin of a pollutant
will not necessarily be a point source. Rapanos v. United States,
547 U.S. 715, 735; 743 (2006).
Pursuant to this well-established legal rule that a point
source must be a discernible, confined and discrete conveyance
that collects or channels water, the piles of overburden waste are
not point sources under the CWA. In 1994, the EPA issued a
technical resource document on gold mining that specifically
stated, “Some discharges from mine sites do not meet the
traditional definition of a ‘point-source discharge.’ Specifically,
runoff from tailings piles, overburden and mine development rock
piles, and other mine areas often is not controlled through a
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discrete conveyance. As a result, these types of discharges have
frequently been considered nonpoint-source discharges.”
Environmental Protection Agency, EPA 530-R-94-013, Technical
Resource Document: Extraction and Beneficiation of Ores and
Minerals, 1-62 (1994). In Dague v. Burlington, the court found
that pollutants transported by runoff from a landfill into a pond
through a railroad culvert were point source discharges. The
court, however, came to this conclusion because the culvert
constituted a point source, not the landfill. See Dague v.
Burlington, 935 F. 2dThe present case is very similar in that the
waste piles, which are the pollutant’s origin, are not also the
point sources discharging those pollutants. Maleau’s waste piles
are not situated in a manner that forms a man-made channel for
water. R. at 5. The waste piles do not collect or otherwise impede
the natural flow of water. Neither are there channels running
down the waste piles (according to the facts set out in
Bonhomme’s Complaint, water flows out through eroded channels
at the bottom of the waste piles). R. at 5. The waste piles are not
part of an artificial system for transporting waste or water, and
they are entirely dissimilar to any and all of the point source
examples provided by Congress. R. at 5. Such piles of rock are not
comparable to the conveyances contemplated by the CWA.
Plaintiff Bonhomme will attempt to draw similarities
between this case and Sierra Club v. Abston Constr. Co., in which
the court stated that, “a point source of pollution may also be
present where miners design spoil piles from discarded
overburden such that, during periods of precipitation, erosion of
spoil pile walls results in discharges into a navigable body of
water by means of ditches, gullies and similar conveyances. . .”
Abston Constr. Co., 620 F.2d at 45. This case can easily be
distinguished from the case at hand. In Abston Constr. Co., the
defendants spoil piles were part of a system meant to transfer
and collect polluted water. The piles were designed and
positioned so that they channeled polluted runoff water into
nearby basins. Id. at 43. Contrastingly, Maleau’s waste piles are
isolated from his mining operation, and are not designed to
channel or collect runoff rainwater. R. at 5. Although the
rainwater that flows over Maleau’s waste piles is transported by
naturally eroded channels to Ditch C-1, these channels are not
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embedded down the sides of the waste piles like those in Abston
Constr. R. at 5.
Defendant Maleau’s waste piles are not point sources because
they are not discernible, confined and discrete conveyances. The
waste piles are not part of a water or waste transportation
system, and they do not channel or collect the polluted water. For
these reasons, the piles of overburden waste cannot be classified
as point sources. Instead, the piles are nonpoint sources and
outside of the EPA’s jurisdiction under the CWA.
B. Piles of mining overburden waste are nonpoint
sources and are not regulated by the CWA.
Maleau’s overburden waste piles are nonpoint sources and
outside of the EPA’s authority under the CWA because Congress
has classified nonpoint source pollution as runoff primarily
caused by rainfall around activities that employ or create
pollutants. Oregon Natural Desert Ass’n v. Dombeck, 172 F.3d
1092, 1098 (9th Cir. 1998).
Nonpoint source pollution is not specifically defined in the
CWA, but it is accepted to be any pollution that does not come
from a point source. Id. The EPA elaborated on this by giving a
non-exclusive list of possible nonpoint sources of pollution, which
includes unchanneled runoff and acid drainage from mines.
Request for Comments, 55 Fed. Reg. 35248 (Aug. 28, 1990).
Nonpoint source pollution generally results from land runoff,
rain, or percolation, and occurs when runoff picks up and carries
away natural and man-made pollutants to navigable waters.
Cordiano, 575 F.3d at 220. “Point and nonpoint sources are not
distinguished by the kind of pollution they create or the activity
causing the pollution, but rather by whether the pollution reaches
navigable waters through a confined, discrete conveyance.”
Trustees for Alaska v. EPA, 749 F.2d 549, 558 (9th Cir. 1984).
Simple erosion over the surface is nonpoint source pollution, as
long as there was no attempt to direct or impede natural runoff.
See Abston Constr. Co., 620 F.2d at 44.
Defendant Maleau’s waste piles neatly fit into the
established rule regarding nonpoint sources. Rainwater flows
naturally over the waste piles, percolates through them, and
discharges at the base of the piles into Ditch C-1. R. at 5.This is
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exactly the type of pollution Congress did not intend to
encompass in the NPDES program. The pollutants from Maleau’s
overburden piles arrive in Ditch C-1 not by way of a discrete
conveyance, but through natural rainwater runoff. This is the
quintessential example of nonpoint source pollution.
For these reasons, this Court should find that Defendant
Maleau’s waste piles are nonpoint sources and outside of the
scope of the CWA’s NPDES program.
IV. DITCH C-1 IS A NAVIGABLE WATER OF THE
UNITED STATES AND IS SUBJECT TO THE CWA
AS IT IS A RELATIVELY PERMANENT WATER
SOURCE THAT MAY BE DEFINED AS A
TRIBUTARY OF REEDY CREEK
Ditch C-1 is not precluded from being classified as navigable
water because it is listed as a possible point source under the
CWA. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (emphasis added). It is not suggested
that Ditch C-1 is navigable-in-fact or capable of being rendered
so. Rather, Ditch C-1 is a tributary of Reedy Creek and therefore
navigable water as defined by the CWA. 40 C.F.R. § 122.2. As
described above, the CWA defines navigable water as “waters of
the United States, including the territorial seas.” 33 U.S.C. §
1362(7). The regulations further define waters of the United
States to include tributaries of interstate waters. 40 C.F.R. §
122.2. There is nothing in Rapanos that “state[s] that every
channel must either be a point source or a navigable water for all
purposes.” United States v. Vierstra, 803 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1174
(D. Idaho 2011) aff’d, 492 F. App’x 738 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal
quotations omitted). Instead, there are situations where a ditch
may be defined as a water of the United States. Due to the fact
that Ditch C-1 is a tributary of Reedy Creek and properly defined
as a water of the United States, the lower court erred in finding
that Ditch C-1 was not navigable water.
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A. Ditch C-1 is a tributary of the navigable Reedy
Creek and therefore must be defined as navigable
under the CWA
A tributary is a “stream which contributes its flow to a larger
stream or other body of water.” Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent
Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526, 533 (9th Cir. 2001). In Rapanos all
the justices agreed that the term “waters of the United States”
encompasses some waters that are not navigable in the
traditional sense. Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715at 730–31, (plurality
opinion);Id.at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment);Id.at
787(Stevens, J., dissenting).
Continuing this theme, the
regulations extend the authority of the CWA to tributaries of
interstate water. 40 C.F.R. § 122.2. Water flow need not be
permanent and the pollutant need not immediately or
continuously reach navigable water for a water to be designated a
tributary. Vierstra, 803 F. Supp. 2d 1166 at 1170.
Ditch C-1 is a relatively permanent water that is protected by
restrictive covenants that require landowners to maintain its
integrity on their property. R. at 5. The Ditch travels through
multiple properties where it is used for agricultural purposes, yet
it still has enough water flow to discharge water into Reedy
Creek. Id. Although Ditch C-1 has interrupted water flow during
times of annual drought this only lasts a few weeks to few
months.
Justice Scalia specifically noted that a relatively
permanent standard does “not necessarily exclude streams,
rivers, or lakes that might dry up in extraordinary circumstances,
such as drought.” Rapanos 547 U.S. 715 at 733. He also did not
“exclude seasonal rivers, which contain continuous flow during
some months of the year but no flow during dry months.” Id.
Although the plurality did not differentiate between intermittent
and seasonal, Ditch C-1 has a flow of water that is more constant
than any seasonal water. Vierstra, 803 F. Supp. 2d 1166 at 1169.
(“non-navigable tributary with a direct surface water connection
to navigable water six to eight months of the year constitutes
waters of the United States”) (internal quotes omitted); United
States v. Moses, 496 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2007) (man-made
intermittent seasonal creek that flowed into navigable water was
a tributary as defined by the CWA).
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There is disagreement about whether Justice Kennedy’s
analysis even applies to non-navigable tributaries or whether his
analysis is confined to wetlands. See Benjamin v. Douglas Ridge
Rifle Club, 673 F.Supp.2d 1210 (D.Or.2009) (holding “Justice
Kennedy’s significant nexus test is inapplicable to determining
the jurisdictionality of tributaries to waters of the United States. .
.. Justice Kennedy limits the applicability of his legal standard to
wetlands adjacent to jurisdictional waters”); but see
Environmental Protection Information Center v. Pacific Lumber
Co., 469 F.Supp.2d 803, 823 (N.D.Cal.2007) (using the significant
nexus test to analyze CWA jurisdiction over of a non-navigable
tributary). However, even if Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus
test was applied, Ditch C-1 is physically connected to navigable
Reedy Creek and is relatively permanent water. There is also
evidence showing that arsenic, carried by water from Ditch C-1, is
being transported to Reedy Creek. R. at 6. Finding a significant
nexus for a non-navigable tributary connected to navigable water
again furthers Justice Kennedy’s overall theory of interpreting
the CWA in light of the purpose of the Act.
It is the purpose of the CWA to protect the waters of the
United States. 33 U.S.C § 1251. This may only be done by
allowing the EPA to enforce authority over waters that directly
affect navigable water. The EPA’s interpretation that waters of
the United States includes tributaries of interstate water,
furthers the purpose and applicability of the CWA. It is also
consistent with the interpretations set forth in Rapanos. Even if
there were inconsistencies, Rapanos should be confined to
analysis regarding expansion of navigability to wetlands as split
opinions should be viewed “on the narrowest grounds.” Marks v.
United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). Therefore, the EPA
interpretation that a tributary of an interstate water is navigable
water is reasonable and should be subjected to Chevron
deference. Chevron, 467 U.S. 837.
Ditch C-1 supports a water flow that is present for almost the
entire year and is physically connected to Reedy Creek. R. at 5.
There is also evidence that arsenic from Ditch C-1 is polluting
Reedy Creek. R. at 6. Therefore, Ditch C-1 is a tributary of
waters of the United States and is navigable water subject to the
CWA.
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B. Ditch C-1 can be a tributary of the CWA because
the CWA only lists ditches as an example of a
possible point source
The CWA defines point source as “any discernible, confined
and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe,
ditch, channel. . ..” 33 U.S.C. § 1362. The lower court relies on
Rapanos to claim that Ditch C-1 cannot be navigable water
because it is listed as a point source. R. at 9. Justice Scalia
stated, “The separate classification of “ditch[es], channel[s], and
conduit[s]which are terms ordinarily used to describe the
watercourses through whichintermittentwaters typically flow—
shows that these are, by and large,notwaters of the United
States.” Rapanos 547 U.S. 715 at 735-36 (internal quotes
omitted). However, Rapanos does not explicitly hold that ditches
may never be waters of the United States. Instead, ditches are
not confined to being identified as a point source when they
support a relatively permanent water flow and are connected to
navigable water. United States v. Vierstra, 803 F. Supp. 2d at
1168.
Justice Scalia justified part of his permanency test by finding
that the CWA separated out relatively permanent waters as
navigable water and intermittent channels as point sources.
Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715 at 735. It was the issue of intermittent
flow, rather than the name of the water, that would result in the
designation as a point source. Justice Scalia never stated that a
ditch may not be a water of the United States, but rather it is the
necessity of statutory interpretation and distinction of navigable
water and intermittent water that precludes intermittent water
from designation as a point source. Id. at 737.
Cases decided after Rapanos have concluded that ditches
may be tributaries of waters of the United States. National Assn.
of Home Builders analyzed Rapanos and found that a ditch,
though included in the definition of a point source, may, under
the certain circumstances, otherwise qualify as waters of the
United States. National Assn. of Home Builders v. United States
Army Corps of Engineers, 699 F.Supp.2d 209. Later Vierstra held
that a Low Line Canal was a non-navigable tributary even
though it may be properly categorized as a point source. United
States v. Vierstra, 803 F. Supp. 2d at 1167. This Low Line Canal
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carried seasonal water six to eight months of the year and was
connected to a ditch, which was then connected to navigable river.
Id. at 1168-69. Vierstra held that the Low Line Canal was part of
a tributary system that included the ditch. Id. at 1168.
Therefore, although Ditch C-1 may be termed a point source,
it is not precluded from also being defined as water of the United
States. Due to the ditch’s permanency, as discussed above, Ditch
C-1 does not implicate the issues raised by Justice Scalia of
separating intermittent and navigable waters for interpreting the
CWA. Ditch C-1 is not the same sort of intermittent water he
believed would create issues of expanding the CWA and
infringing on state regulation power. This interpretation abides
by his statutory interpretation and the necessity of distinct
sections of the CWA. Therefore, this court should hold that Ditch
C-1 is navigable water.
V. OWNERS AND OPERATORS OF POINT SOURCES
THAT DISCHARGE POLLUTANTS ARE LIABLE
FOR THE DISCHARGE EVEN WHEN THEY
THEMSELVES DID NOT ADD THE POLLUTANT
Plaintiff Bonhomme must be held liable for any discharges of
pollutants because they are discharged through the culvert on his
property. Owners and operators of point sources are liable for the
pollutants they discharge, regardless of whether the owner or
operator took any affirmative action to add the pollutant or
channel the polluted water. See S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v.
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 104-05 (2004).
Point source owners may be liable for pollutant discharges
occurring on their land, regardless of whether they acted in some
way to cause the discharge. Sierra Club v. El Paso Gold Mines,
Inc., 421 F.3d 1133, 1145 (10th Cir. 2005). To base liability on
whether the operator or owner of the point source added the
pollutant, or on whether the pollutant originated with the point
source would be untenable and not in keeping with the goals of
the CWA. S. Fla. Water Mgmt., 541 U.S. at 104-05. Individuals
are not relieved from liability merely because they themselves did
not construct the point source or did not add pollutants to it. El
Paso Gold Mines, Inc., 620 F.2d 41 at 45. Although the term
“addition” implies affirmative conduct, contemporaneous
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introduction of pollutants through a point source is sufficient to
satisfy this element. See generally El Paso Gold Mines, Inc., 421
F.3d 1133. As the court in El Paso Gold Mines, Inc. so aptly
stated, “if you own the leaky faucet, you are responsible for its
drips.” Id. at 1145.
Based on the rule stated above, Plaintiff Bonhomme should
be held liable for the discharges of pollutants coming from his
culvert. It is irrelevant that Bonhomme did not add the pollutant
to his culvert, and it is equally irrelevant that the pollutant did
not originate in the culvert. See S. Fla. Water Mgmt., 541 U.S. at
104-05. The language in the CWA relating to discharges of
pollutants consistently refers to “owners and operators” of point
sources, which strongly suggests that the CWA is more concerned
with not the impetus of the pollutants entering the water, but
rather the means by which they eventually reach the water. See
generally S. Fla. Water Mgmt. In furtherance of its sweeping
goals, the CWA intends to cast a net of liability that catches as
many potential responsible individuals as possible. Bonhomme
owns the culvert and must be held liable for any polluted
substance that it emits. The case Froebel v. Meyer, which stated
that affirmative action was required to establish liability, does
not apply here because it dealt with § 404 violations. Section 402,
which regulates the discharge of pollutants, focuses on the point
source, that is, the means by which the pollutants are conveyed
into navigable water; contrastingly, § 404 focuses on the actor
causing the pollution.
Bonhomme may attempt to point out Sakonnet v. Dutra, in
which the court states that liability must lie with the person
causing the addition of the pollutant. Sakonnet v. Dutra, 738 F.
Supp. 623, 630 (D.R.I. 1980). This opinion, which emphasized the
importance of the person controlling the pollutants, is clearly
superseded by the much more recent and binding S.Fla. Water
Mgmt. opinion. Even though Bonhomme was not in control of the
pollutant itself, he did control the point source discharging it;
under S. Fla. Water Mgmt., this is sufficient to establish liability
under the CWA.
Even if this court held that Defendant Maleau’s waste piles
were point sources (Progress argues that they are not; see section
III, supra) that discharged into the navigable water Ditch C-1,
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Bonhomme still could not escape liability because his culvert
would still be a point source. Intervening channels such as
Bonhomme’s culvert are point sources under the CWA. See
United States v. Ortiz, 427 F.3d 1278, 1281 (10th Cir. 2005);
Dague, 935 F.2d at 1355.
As a side note, the agricultural stormwater discharge
provisions of the CWA do not cover the discharges from
Bonhomme’s culvert. In its definition section, the CWA states
that agricultural stormwater discharges are not point sources. 33
U.S.C. § 1362. Although Bonhomme may try to argue that he
cannot be liable for discharges coming out of his culvert because
they result from agricultural runoff (several farms feed into the
culvert that discharges from Bonhomme’s property) (R. at 5), this
argument does not hold water—once the agricultural runoff is
collected and channeled by the culvert, it becomes point source
pollution. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Brown, 640 F.3d 1063, 1070-71
(9th Cir. 2011).
The culvert on Bonhomme’s property is the instrumentality
through which pollutants are discharged into Reedy Creek. The
fact that Bonhomme did not construct the culvert and had no
control over the addition of the pollutants flowing through it is
irrelevant to the issue of liability for the discharge. This court
should affirm the lower court’s decision and hold Bonhomme
liable for the discharge of pollutant in violation of the CWA.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons this court should affirm the lower
court’s decisions that Bonhomme is not a proper plaintiff, that
Maleau’s waste piles are not point sources, that Bonhomme is
liable for discharges that occur on his property, and that Reedy
Creek is a navigable water of the United States. This should
court reverse the district court’s holding, and find that Ditch C-1
is a navigable water of the United States.
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